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Abstract 
This study reviewed if there are ways to recover messages, image, videos, and call logs 
within the mobile application Signal, developed by Open Whisper Systems.  The purpose of this 
study was to research the data recovery as fact or fiction, while providing which tools and 
extraction methods produced more accurate results.  Further research was needed to explore data 
recovered from an Android mobile device compared to an iOS mobile device.  The forensic tools 
used to conduct this research included UFED 4PC (Universal Forensic Extraction Device), 
version 6.3.1.477 with an internal build version 4.7.1.477 and UFED Physical Analyzer version 
6.3.11.36, developed by Cellebrite.  The study also compared the results using Cellebrite to three 
different open source tools, iPhone Analyzer, iExplorer, and Autopsy.  The meaning of open 
source can be a tool or program that is designed for specific tasks, yet the source code is openly 
published to the public.  These tools or programs are free of charge unless the user opts to pay 
for the expanded versions.  
Overall, the results were dependent on the make and model of the mobile devices.  Out of 
four different types of mobile devices, only one device produced viable results when it came to 
the Signal Application.  The physical extraction from UFED 4PC and Physical Analyzer on the 
Android ZTE Z993 device was able to recover an abundant amount of data.  The other three 
devices produced minimal results only showing the installation of the application, but no real 
message data using the UFED 4PC version 6.3.1.477 and UFED Physical Analyzer version 
6.3.11.36 software.  The three open source software, iPhone Analyzer, iExplorer, and Autopsy 
also produced minimal results with the exception of the Android ZTE Z993 device.  Autopsy free 
version was able to parse the data missed by the Cellebrite commercial tools and recover some of 
the missing images within messages sent inside of the Signal Application.   
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Mobile Forensics: Analysis of the Messaging Application Signal 
Chapter I   
Introduction 
Before the dawn of the digital age, crime scene technicians didn’t require the same steps 
to preserve evidence as they do now.  Mobile device forensics is directly connected to digital 
forensics and can be defined as being the recovery of digital information or data which is often 
used for criminal evidence (Bommisetty et al., 2014). Mobile Device Forensics by definition 
applies only to mobile devices, e.g. tablets, cell phones etc., but the term also includes any 
portable digital device that has both internal memory and communication abilities such as PDA 
devices and GPS devices (Bommisetty et al., 2014). With all the recent advancements in 
technology, there is an increasing amount of digital evidence that could be considered vital to a 
case.  Many computers, phones, and tablets hold the key to unlocking a mystery, solving a case, 
or ensuring the guilt or innocence of a person of interest.  Mobile devices hold a magnitude of 
information, such as call logs, text messages, pictures, videos, GPS locations, internet browsing 
history, and an array of applications to uncover and dissect.  Unfortunately, with those same 
advancements, come security and privacy concerns.  Looking at mobile devices, those concerns 
are now becoming helpful to the user, but harmful to an investigation.   
Security and privacy not only create obstacles for crime scene technicians, but also, 
investigations can stall while attempting to obtain vital evidence from an encrypted device or an 
encrypted messaging application.  There are multiple applications that enable a mobile device to 
send and receive instant messaging, video calls, images, and text messages.  These applications 
were once not as secure and did not enable the user to change or hide what was sent or received, 
those times have changed.  Currently, Android applications use SQLite database files to store 
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data.  SQLite is an implementation of a Structured Query Language database.  SQLite is an open 
source, in process library that contains a no configuration database engine.  This type of database 
is often popular due to its size and reliability. The database can be recognized by the file 
extensions .db and .sqlitedb, or have no extension at all (Kelel 2013).  In order to retrieve this 
database, it would have to be acquired from the devices using a validated method of extraction.   
In the last eight to ten years, open source code has been shared in order to enable 
developers to encrypt the databases of these devices.  As previously stated, the meaning of open 
source can be a tool or program that is designed for specific tasks, yet the source code is openly 
published to the public.  These tools or programs are free of charge unless the user opts to pay 
for the expanded versions. While this is great for the user in terms of privacy and secure 
conversations, this could be damaging if the encryption was unable to be decrypted. The 
database stores all of the messaging capability within some applications available both 
commercially and open source.  Commercial tools are best explained as the software or tools that 
are paid for, while opens source tools are available through the internet. Open source tools are 
completely free, while having the option of paying for certain aspects or extra tools within the 
software.  With all of these changes, it has become difficult for the technicians and investigators 
to keep up with the evolving technology.  It seems like every day there are more and more ways 
that a criminal can hide a digital footprint that was once left behind for a forensic examiner to 
find.  If criminals are able to download free applications in order to commit crimes and hide the 
evidence such as timestamped messages, images, and even “ghosting” GPS locations, then the 
investigator or examiner could end up with nothing or unreliable results.   
This study began as a conversation between work colleagues, as well as, current media 
coverage of the government using the Signal application for messages during the recent 
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Presidential election.  There seemed to be a common misconception that since government 
agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, could not break the Signal encryption that 
forensically, the messages could never be retrieved (Barrett 2017).   This revealed an array of 
questions. What if? What if they couldn’t be retrieved? What if this changes everything we can 
do when it comes to mobile forensics?  
 
Background 
As previously stated, there are an abundance of applications in different operating 
systems like Android and iOS.  One application is Signal.  Signal is end-to-end encrypted, 
meaning that no one but the device and conversational partner’s device can read the messages 
sent. The team behind the software, Open Whisper Systems, is a privacy centered not-for-profit 
organization, and relies on grants and donations. This company is very small with only around 10-
12 employees. Perhaps most importantly, Signal is open source, meaning that the code is publicly 
viewable. It can be examined for potential security holes, and according to many different 
reviews, it has stood up to auditing.  The tool is peer reviewed, meaning it’s reviewed by not only 
the author, but other colleagues, users, and testers, to determine if there are any technical errors 
or issues with the code of the software.  In this case, the code is open source so that the public 
can also review, modify, and even correct any errors found.  The developers claim that no matter 
what, the data could not be recovered by a third party and is not stored on any servers within 
Whisper Systems (Marlinspike 2017).  The information collected is saved long enough to send 
and receive the messages and then it would be gone.   
There are plenty of articles and recent news worthy uses of signal, but what does this 
mean for the forensic community?   Well, in short, that is why this research needed to be done.  
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Many articles claim that the security of the application renders hackers unable to access your 
message, images, or videos.  The claim is dependent on if you are in a secure connection with 
another person.  It has been reviewed over and over yet nobody speaks about what could happen 
if that same phone is in someone else’s hand.    
Signal started out as a voice calling application called RedPhone with an encrypted 
texting program called TextSecure in 2010.  The company then switched to Whisper Systems and 
released firewalls, as well as, other forms of encrypting data.  At the time, all of their 
applications were only for the Android platform.  In 2011, they were acquired by Twitter who 
then released these two applications under the GPL3v (General Public License) making it an 
open source software.  In 2014, Whisper Systems changed the name of the protocol to merge 
RedPhone and TextSecure thus creating the Signal Application.  Since then, Signal has been 
consistently updated with more and more features (Wikipedia 2017).     
Currently, Signal allows voice and video calls, group or single text messages, pictures, 
and video messages on iOS and Android devices.  Signal uses a Wi-Fi or data connection, and 
uses encryption keys to verify each of the end-to-end encryption.  The keys that are used for the 
encryption are stored on the users’ mobile device, not with the developer.  In order to 
authenticate between connections, users will either compare key fingerprints or scan QR codes. 
Signal will also notify users of key changes.  Not all communication within Signal has to be end-
to-end encrypted.  The user can opt out of the encryption and allow unencrypted communication 
to be sent and received.  In order for any of the encryption to work, both users must have the 
Signal application installed (Shelton 2017).  Recently, Whisper Systems released another update 
to the application.  Users can now set timers for their messages to be deleted once the intended 
recipient has read the message (Lund 2017).  The timers can be set from seconds to up to a week 
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long.  As of right now, unencrypted messages, to include those on an iOS cloud backup, are not 
able to use this feature.   
Signal seems to have created some sense of security; it has also created and overcome 
many limitations.  One of the limitations is the set-up.  Signal requires users to have a phone 
number for verification that can only be used on one device.  This phone number does not have 
to be the user’s number located on the device, but can be a VoIP or even a landline telephone 
number.  The phone number just needs to be able to receive the verification code for the set-up to 
be completed.  Users can also set-up a Google Voice account in order to receive the verification.  
Signal was once only specific to the Android platform, but since has branched out to the iOS 
platform.    
While Signal stores messages, keys, and passphrases on the user device, overall it still 
needs servers to relay these messages and locate contacts who also have the Signal application 
installed.  With video and voice calls, the exchange is peer-to-peer.  If the caller is not within the 
contacts of the Signal user, the call is then routed through the servers in order to conceal the 
users IP address (Marlinspike 2017). One major limitation still exists for Signal.  The application 
uses the servers to locate other contacts that are registered, thus not having any preservation for 
privacy. Whisper Systems claims that the numbers are only stored long enough to connect the 
calls, but what if the servers were hacked, would all the registered phone numbers be uncovered?  
The phone number may not be able to show who the direct user is, but even though it’s easy to 
use another phone number, many users still communicate using the phone number original to the 
mobile device. Overall, it’s unclear if the user’s anonymity would remain intact.   
Whisper Systems has released the complete source code so that users and developers can 
examine the code and report back to the creators that it is functioning as it should.  This also 
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enables developers to make their own copies and versions of applications using the same 
encryption code.  Everything from the encryption to the servers is available as open source code.  
Whisper Systems will provide support with their own applications and servers, but will not 
provide support for those users or developers who host their own servers (Lund 2017).  The 
Signal application is available and distributed through Google Play, Apple, and the Chrome Web 
Store.  Even with the encryption and server available to the public, many features within Signal 
have caught the attention of some government officials, as well as, Edward Snowden, former 
CIA employee and NSA contractor.  Snowden is also responsible for the leak of multiple agency 
surveillance programs.  He has deemed this application and anything created by Whisper 
Systems a secure and reliable application to use.   
In 2012, The National Security Agency deemed one of the original parts to Signal, 
RedPhone, a major threat to the ability to track and reveal communications between enemies of 
our country.  As previously stated, in 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union urged officials at 
the U.S. Capitol to have the staff begin to use the Signal application as a form of secure 
communication.  It had been rumored that during the recent presidential election, candidates and 
staff used Signal in order to exchange communications about the opposing candidate.  In 2017, 
the U.S Senate approved the use of Signal within government organizations.  Senator Ron 
Wyden stated “I have long argued that strong, backdoor-free encryption is an important 
cybersecurity technology that the government should be embracing, not seeking to regulate or 
outlaw. My own Senate website, which has used HTTPS by default since 2015, was the first 
Senate website to do so. With the transition to default HTTPS for all of the other Senate websites 
and the recent announcement by your office that the end-to-end encrypted messaging app Signal 
is approved for Senate staff use, I am happy to see that you too recognize the important defensive 
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cybersecurity role that encryption can play”. (Hardwick 2017).  HTTPS is the HyperText 
Protocol Secure.  HTTP defines how messages are formatted and transmitted over the internet, 
but in cases with HTTPS, there is a secure socket layer (SSL) for security purposes.  The types of 
websites that normally use this are e-commerce, banking, and investments.  An example of an e-
commerce site would be Target.  Target uses the secure socket layer to protect user’s credit card 
or banking information while making purchases from their website.   
Overall, the application is becoming more and more popular due to the security and 
privacy it offers the user.  In an article written by Thorin Klosowki, he summed up the easiest 
way to understand what signal is and how it works.  Klosowki stated “Pretty much any article 
you read about security, from Snowden to Russia, includes a mention of Signal. That’s because 
every message that’s sent over Signal supports end-to-end encryption. This security measure 
means that if someone intercepted your messages, or found them on a server somewhere, they 
would see gibberish, not the actual text of a conversation. Signal is also open-source, peer-
reviewed, and routinely audited, which means it’s pretty much always up to date from a security 
standpoint.” While the company may have a small amount of employees, around ten or so, the 
application is taking off like a wildfire, and is sure to grow more and more interest over the 
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Chapter II 
Research Questions 
During this research there were four questions that were to be examined.  Can you 
retrieve data from the Signal Application on Android and iOS platforms?  Signal was originally 
for the Android platform and then expanded to the iOS platforms and in order to give the 
research some depth, both platforms needed to be utilized.  The extraction methods were 
dependent on the model of the mobile devices and not all extraction methods were available for 
each device.  This led to the next question in the research.  Which methods of extraction are the 
most useful?  Depending on the model of the mobile devices, the extraction method was either 
physical, logical, or the file system.  The types of extractions also give different amounts of data.   
In order to properly do the extractions, multiple tools needed to be utilized.  Which 
software or tools were able to provide the most data?  The tools used were from Cellebrite, 
iPhone Analyzer, Autopsy, and iExplorer.  Not all tools were used on all of the devices since 
some of the tools were only made to operate with either Android or iOS.  Finally, the question 
remained if more or the same amount of data would be recovered between the Android and iOS 
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Methodology  
This study reviewed if there was a way to forensically recover messages, images, videos, 
and call logs within the Signal Application developed by Open Whisper Systems.  Currently, 
there is not enough data or research on whether this is a viable option.  If the data is not able to 
be recovered using the current tools in mobile forensics then this could pose serious issues to 
investigations and the forensic community.  Not being able to retrieve this data could give a 
suspect the ability to hide a vast amount of criminal activity.  The purpose of the study was to 
research the data recovery abilities as fact or fiction, while providing which tools and extraction 
methods were the most useful.  Further research was conducted to explore if the data was more 
easily recovered from an Android device or an iOS device.  The accessibility to the data was the 
key to the completion of this study.   
Due to limited commercial forensic tools, the extractions were performed with UFED 
4PC (Universal Forensic Extraction Device), version 6.3.1.477 with an internal build version 
4.7.1.477 and UFED Physical Analyzer version 6.3.11.36.   UFED 4PC enables multiple 
acquisitions and updates frequently to support the current mobile operating systems.  The type of 
forensic acquisition method was dependent on the make and model of phone and operating 
system.  The Android ZTE Z993, allowed for a physical, logical, and filesystem extraction, while 
the Android LG, iPhone 4S, and the iPhone 7, devices only allowed the filesystem or logical 
extractions. Due to the security on these devices, recent versions of iOS platforms are now only 
allowing the extraction via logical or filesystem.  A physical extraction is the extraction that 
would produce the most data.  It extracts the bit-by-bit binary image of the mobile device flash 
memory.  This type of memory contains the file system, user data, hidden files, unallocated 
space, and may even contain passwords.  The Filesystem extraction can produce the user data, 
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file system, mobile application data, and, dependent on the make and model of a device, the 
hidden or protected files.  The logical extraction contains the user data such as, SMS, call logs, 
pictures, videos, audio files, contact lists, and some application data.  The logical extraction does 
not recover deleted data.  
 In the event that an acquisition could not be completed on a specific Android device, 
rooting the device could possibly allow access to the file system extraction.  Rooting allows the 
user to obtain privileged control or root access.  It acts as an administrative permission to 
overcome limitations that either the carrier or hardware manufacturers set so that the user can 
alter or replace system applications, change settings, or run special applications.  Rooting is 
similar to Jailbreaking for an iOS device but Jailbreaking bypasses multiple types of prohibitions 
that Apple has placed on the device.  Jailbreaking allows the user to change the operating system 
and install non-approved applications to an iOS device.    For this study, none of the mobile 
devices were rooted or jailbroken.   Once the acquisition is performed using UFED 4 PC version 
6.3.1.477, Cellebrite Physical Analyzer version 6.3.11.36 enables the user to run physical and file 
system extractions on an iOS device depending on the make and model of the phone. Physical 
Analyzer version 6.3.11.36 also allowed an advanced logical extraction to be performed on the 
iPhone 4S.  Physical Analyzer version 6.3.11.36 can also decode Android physical extractions.  
Currently, Cellebrite, the creator of UFED tools, also has a feature called UFED Cloud Analyzer.  
On both the iPhone 4S and the iPhone 7, iCloud had a listed account, but the backup feature was 
turned off.  This feature was not useful during the course of this study. This tool is only available 
in Physical Analyzer version 6.3.11.36 as an additional feature.  
Two Android devices and two iOS Apple mobile devices will be used to extract data from 
the Signal application and forensically examine which data was available and the amount of data 
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available.  The first device used was a ZTE Z993 Prelude, Android 4.1.1 with a kernel version of 
3.4.0 (Figure 1).  The extractions were performed using a Cellebrite Black Tip T-100 with cable 
adapter A.   The second device was a LGUS375, Android 6.0 with a kernel version of 3.10.49 
(Figure 2).  The extractions were performed also using a Cellebrite Black Tip T-100 with cable 
adapter A.  The Apple devices being utilized were an iPhone 4S IOS 9.3.5 (Figure 3) and an 
iPhone 7 IOS 11.0.3 (Figure 4). The iPhone 4S extractions were with a Black Tip T-110 with 
cable adapter A, while the iPhone 7 used a Cellebrite 210 cable.    
Each mobile device was chosen with separate operating systems due to the fact that in 
some cases, the systems will store data differently.  A factory reset was done on each device prior 
to the install of the Signal Application with the exception of the iPhone7. The iPhone 7 did not 
have a factory reset completed to show exactly how much information would be on a suspects 
phone, as well as, if there were any differences using a newer device vs the older versions. All 
available extractions for each of the four devices were completed using UFED 4PC version 
6.3.1.477 to show what the basic software available would obtain from the Signal Application.   
In the following paragraphs, step-by-step instructions are detailed on how to properly install and 
activate the Signal Application using a Google Voice obtained mobile number.  The hardware 
that was used was provided by the University of Central Oklahoma.  The computer used was a 
Forensic Recovery of Evidence Device or FRED for short.  All extractions, reports, screenshots, 
and other images used in the study were saved on a DiamondMax 8S SATA150 HDD, 40 GB 
external hard drive.   
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Figure 1  ZTE Z993 
 
Figure 2 LGUS375 
 
Figure 3 iPhone 4S 
 
Figure 4 iPhone 7 
 
Signal requires a telephone number in order to install and register the application.  The 
research done with this study was completed using WIFI only and the mobile devices did not 
have the cellular option enabled.  Because of this, a google voice account was set for each 
device.  The first step to verifying Signal was to set up each phone with a Gmail account.  Once 
the email account was active, a google voice account was attached to each email.  The google 
voice works just as if it had been a mobile device. The user can make calls, send messages, and 
even have a voicemail set up.  Within Signal, the main requirement is to verify the application 
with a mobile or landline phone number.  The google voice number was inputted and a code was 
sent to the google voice account in order to register that number to that Signal account.  Signal 
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only allows for one phone number to be registered at a time so there were four separate accounts 
set up for each one of the mobile devices used.  This requirement, while bothersome at times to 
users, also gives users the availability to register a phone number that is not tied to their personal 
mobile device or home phone numbers.  Signal locates contacts that are already registered users 
stored in the mobile device.  Other users can be located by typing in the Signal number that the 
user has set up and registered.  See Figures 5-12 listed below.   
 








The first step is to enter either the actual 
mobile device number or the one created 
using Google Voice.  In this case,  the phone 
numbers were generated from Google Voice.  
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The next step will inform the user the mobile 
or landline number is about to be verified.  
Hit the continue button.  
 








Once the process begins, the six digit code 
will be sent via text message.  After the code 
is entered, Signal will register the phone 







In order to provide a variety of data to extract on the devices, calls, text, images, and 
videos were exchanged. Table 1 shows an example of the variation of message types were 
delivered and received between all four mobile devices.  In each set of messages at least one 
image and basic text messages were exchanged.  There were also a videos sent between the four 
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devices. In order to use all the functions of Signal, multiple messages were set to disappear and 
some were also deleted by hand. Signal enables the sender to set messages to disappear between 
five seconds and up to one week from the time the message is read (Figure 8).  Open Whisper 
Systems prides itself on being a secure way to communicate.  In order to provide that security, 
they have given users the ability to check what they call safety numbers to ensure that the person 
you are communicating with is also secure and verified.  Figures 9 through 12 show users how 
these safety numbers look within the Signal Application.  The safety numbers can be verified 
between parties by either matching the numbers listed or if you are in the same area as the 
person, you can scan the QR code and it will either show a green check mark or a red X if the 





Figure 8 Disappearing Message Settings Collazo (2017) 
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Figure 9 Safety Numbers Collazo (2017) 
 
Figure 10 Safety Numbers Collazo (2017) 
 
Figure 11 Safety Accepted  Collazo (2017) 
 
Figure 12 Safety Denied Collazo (2017) 
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Table 1 ZTE Z993 Log of messages 
 
In order to properly examine the data that was extracted from all four devices, open 
source tools were also used to achieve the best possible results.  There are multiple types of open 
source mobile tools.  The open source tools being used were Autopsy and iPhone Analyzer.  The 
Autopsy tool supports parsing commonly missed items from Android devices, while giving faster 
access to the File System directory.  iPhone Analyzer extracts backups, photos, SMS messages, 
and GPS information from iOS devices.  Another open source tool being used was iExplorer.  
iExplorer enables the user to examine the contents of their own device from a back-up.  This also 
gives the user to be able to save voicemails, messages, or even call logs.  Signal gives an option 
to merge the messaging with the mobile device messaging, if user choses this option, the 
iExplorer can recover the chat logs. A limitation that may be encountered when using open 
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source tools is that they are not fully tested or validated and may miss some of the data that could 




 The results of this study vary by the make and model of the device.  Some of them were 
surprising, while others left the examination with more questions.  Out of all four devices, the 
Z993 Prelude (ZTE Android) phone was the only one that allowed a physical extraction.  When 
the physical extraction was completed on the ZTE device, it showed almost everything within 
Signal sent and received by the other devices (Figure 13).  One of the surprising factors was that 
a few of the messages came up labeled as TextSecure instead of Signal (Figure 19) within the 
filesystem extraction results.  TextSecure was the original name prior to the merger to create 
Signal.   
Another raised questions was on the deleted message, it gives a timestamp, showed a read 
status, who sent and who received, yet shows it unsent on the information panel on the right side 
of UFED 4 PC version 6.3.1.477. Also, on the deleted message it shows that it was delivered and 
read, yet on the main screen of UFED 4 PC version 6.3.1.477 it shows unread as shown in 
Figure 17.  While the ZTE Android did provide more information, getting the extractions to 
complete required many more steps than working with an iPhone.  Some of the extractions on 
the Android devices required the mobile device to have specific settings unlocked or locked in 
order to obtain the extractions. For example, on the ZTE, the USB debugging option, developer 
tools, stay awake mode must be turned on, while, the screen lock mode needs to be turned off.  
Cellebrite tools gave exact directions on which device had to have these types of options on or 
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off depending on which version of Android you are using.  The menu has listings for Android 4.2 
and higher and Android 4.0 – 4.1.2.    
The Android ZTE Z993, did produce some results with the open source version of 
Autopsy.  Autopsy recovered data concluding the application does exist on the device, the phone 
numbers accessed and messaged, and one of the images that was sent within a Signal message 
was uncovered (Figure 21).  It also showed, an event occurred assigning the safety numbers, but 
did not reveal the actual numbers used from Signal to the other user (Figure 22).  Autopsy has a 
commercial version as well and much more data could have been retrieved having used the 
commercial version.  Overall, Autopsy was the open source tool that recovered the most data 
from the phones used in this study.  Autopsy parsed the data and found missed items that 
Cellebrite did not locate. For example, there was an image sent through a Signal message that 
showed up in UFED 4PC version 6.3.1.477, but did not show the actual image.  In Autopsy, that 
image was revealed with a timestamp, yet not message information (Figure 20).  The iPhone 
Analyzer and iExplorer are not compatible with Android devices to do any types of extractions.   
In Tables 2 through 9, the results of the findings are broken down by the type of 
extraction completed, the make of the device and the commercial or open source tool used for 
that extraction.  The findings listed are only the ones associated with the Signal Application.  The 
extractions provided an abundance of information, but since it was not pertinent to the research 
of the Signal application, it was not included in these results.  
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Figure 14  Deleted message shown without the actual message ZTE Z993 Prelude 
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Figure 16 Signal message missing the image ZTE Z993 Prelude 
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Figure 18 Logical Extraction Results ZTE Z993 Prelude 
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Figure 20 Autopsy showing picture data inside Signal Application with ZTE Z993 
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In Table 4 and 5, the data recovered from the logical and filesystem extractions are listed.  
Physical extractions were not supported for the LGUS375 Android device.  In Figure 23, the 
extraction shows that the application was installed, but contained no further data regarding the 
messages sent or received.  Once again, if a physical extraction would have been available then 
an exact copy of the mobile device could have yielded better results.  Figure 24, the filesystem 
extraction recovered and equal amount of data as in the logical extraction.  The only information 
shown was that the application was installed.  Both iPhone and Android users have the option for 
storage and backups.  Google Drive is the storage option used for Android devices.  The access 
to this drive would only be available to examiners with the additional Cloud Analyzer feature 
which was not available for this study.  
 
 
Table 4 LG US375 K8 Results 
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Table 5 LG US375 K8 Results 
 
 
Figure 23 LG Logical 
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Figure 24  LG File System 
 
 
The physical extractions were not supported for neither the iPhone 4S or the iPhone 7.  
Since a physical extraction by definition acquires more data from the device, it could be 
assumed, especially with the iPhones, that there could have been more relevant data recovered.   
The iPhone 4S and iPhone 7 data did not produce the results that were expected.  Neither the 
commercial nor the open source tools were helpful in retrieving the messages, images, and video, 
sent between the devices.  In all available extractions for the iPhone 4S and iPhone 7, the 
application was shown as installed, but the actual data within the application was not visible.  
IPhone’s can automatically back up the data from Signal to iCloud, but this is also a feature that 
can be manually turned off, as in this case.  
The iCloud is iPhone’s version of a storage drive. Although, Signal can back up data to 
the user’s iCloud account, that doesn’t mean it is retrievable with current commercial forensic 
tools.  Currently, the UFED Cloud Analyzer that is available does not support gathering data 
from the Signal application.  The interesting part of the supported devices, is that the WhatsApp 
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is supported which was developed using the Signal encryption (Cellebrite, Cloud Analyzer 
2017). Tables 6 through 9 show the breakdown of what was found using both the commercial 
tools and open source tools.  
 
 
Table 6 iPhone 4S Results 
 
 
Table 7 iPhone 4S Results 
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With the iPhone, there were no features that had to be turned on or off in order to 
complete the extraction.  The examiner only had to allow trust between the device and the 
computer.   Two advanced logical extractions were completed with Physical Analyzer version 
6.3.11.36 on the iPhone 4S, but the iPhone 7 was not supported. Once all the extractions were 
completed with the available commercial tools, UFED 4 PC version 6.3.1.477 and UFED 
Physical Analyzer version 6.3.11.36, the open source tools were utilized. The open source tools 
used in this study were iPhone Analyzer, iExplorer and Autopsy.  There was no surprise by the 
small amounts of data that was recovered using the open source tools.  Some of these tools also 
have a pay option which could expand the results, but not definitive to the Signal Application.   
With iPhone Analyzer, iPhone 4S only shows the Signal application files and libraries on 
the device, yet messages, emails, contact logs, contact lists, or images were included. The iTunes 
backup of the iPhone 4S and iPhone 7 were the files used to analyze and recover with iPhone 
Analyzer.  The only view was that it was installed onto the device (Figures 29). The factory 
applications were also revealed. The iPhone 7 produced similar results, but also had SMS 
messages from the original messaging source, not Signal.  Signal gives the option to link the 
SMS messaging already on the mobile device with the Signal Application.  If this occurs, then it 
could be expected to see all of the messaging due to the results showing all other messages 





MOBILE FORENSICS  36 





Figure 26 iPhone 4S Filesystem Extraction showing installed Signal Application 
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Figure 29 iPhone Explorer iPhone 4S and iPhone 7 
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Figure 30 iExplorer showing no messages or chats with iPhone4S and iPhone7 
 
  
Overall, the results were less than promising.  Thus far, the amount of information that 
was received from the device were absolutely dependent on the type of device and the type of 
extraction that is available.  The physical extraction yielded the most results compared to the file 
system and logical extractions.  When it came down to which operating system would provide 
more information, in this study, it was the Android.  More research is needed to determine if 
there would have better results extracting the information from the backups located on the iCloud 
accounts. Currently the UFED Cloud Analyzer is not compatible with the Signal data source.  
Future research could be completed with updates to the Cellebrite software and available data 
sources.  The only phone that displayed almost everything from the installation, to all of the 
conversations between the four devices was the ZTE Z993 Prelude with the Cellebrite tools.  
This was the only phone that supported a physical extraction, which could answer why it had the 
most results recovered. The ZTE Z993 was one of the older versions out of all four devices, yet it 
compiled higher results than the three other phones.  This is a clear example of the types of 
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phones supported by Cellebrite, and what the software, security, and model will allow the 
examiner to recover.  
The point of this study was to see the volume of data, if any, could be extracted.  The 
other reasons were to find out which brand of phone had more discoverable data, in this case it 
was the Android phone, ZTE Z993 Prelude that produced the most information.  Although, with 
the ZTE Z993, the images and actual text were missing that were set to disappear or had been 
manually deleted, the timestamp and date were still recoverable along with many other messages 
in that particular chat session within the Cellebrite tools.   One of the questionable results that 
were obtained was why the text messages that did show, come up as the prior name for the 
company?  Cellebrite also showed some of the messages were delivered and sent, yet on the 
information panel they show unsent or unread in some cases. This occurred on both of the 
Android devices, and only on the commercial software from Cellebrite. For this study, only three 
open source tools were selected, but all had the potential to become commercial tools with more 
features and options if the user decided to pay additional fees.  If the commercial versions of 
these tools were used then the results may have been different.  In the future, the commercial 
version of Cellebrite could offer physical extractions regardless of brand or version of the iPhone 
which would help tremendously with any future extractions. The physical extraction will always 
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Chapter III 
Literature Review  
Over the years, more and more open source messaging applications have become readily 
available.  One of the articles that was reviewed was by Shubham Sahu (2014).  The purpose of 
the article was focused on extracting useful data from the WhatsApp along with similar 
applications installed on an Android platform device.  The depth of the study covered the 
extraction of the data and the tool available in order to decrypt and organize SQLite database 
files. The article also reviewed both an older version of the application and the most recent 
upgrade.  
One of the main reasons many people move to these new messaging applications is the 
fact that there are no restrictions on the length of the message or any fees involved.  Originally 
the WhatsApp messages were being stored in the msgstor.db file.  This posed a serious security 
risk due to the messages, including deleted ones, in its entirety could be retrieved. Currently, 
according to WhatsApp officials, the database has a custom AES encryption algorithm with 
above a 192 bit encryption key mainly used in the WhatsApp Android platform.  WhatsApp data 
is stored in the internal memory of the mobile device.  Once the application is installed, it 
synchronizes with the users contacts, and shows other users who have the application installed.  
When the mobile device is turned on after installation, the com.whatsapp sends a signal to start 
the ExternalMediaManage and MessageService services, which run in the background. 
The accelerated increase in open source messaging applications over the last five to eight 
years has enabled users to communicate in ways far more advanced than we could have ever 
imagined.  The next article reviewed was by Aditya Mahajan, M.S. Dahiya, and H.P. Sanghvi 
(2013), focused on two messaging applications.  The first application is the WhatsApp and the 
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second is the Viber.  “People are constantly exchanging information like images, videos, 
activities, and events” (Mahajan et al., 2013).  With all the advancements in technology, the 
security of the same people consistently chatting and exchanging information is becoming more 
and more vulnerable.  Criminals are also catching onto the fact that fast deleting applications are 
now a haven for criminal activity and anonymity.  In 2013, when this article was published, 
WhatsApp had already had over a million downloads on Google Play.  Viber was sitting at one 
hundred and forty million.     
The overall focus of this article was to show the forensic examination of data and 
information stored by these two applications, as well as, the data extraction tools and techniques 
used.  WhatsApp focuses more on the exchanges of text, video, and audio messages.  They also 
enable the user to have group communication.  The Viber application is mainly for free calling 
and free texting only.  Some of the limitations we face with Android include the difficulty in 
accessing and extracting the data needed to do a forensic examination.  This can become more 
difficult if the information is encrypted or has been deleted from the device.  Often the device is 
connected to the internet as well so it can be remotely wiped if the owner wishes.   
 
 
 Sahu extracted the database file from an Android device.  The file msgstor.db.crypt was 
retrieved in the acquisition yet a problem arose because of its encryption.  In order to properly 
decrypt the file, Sahu used a tool created by Francesco Picasso called the WhatsApp Xtract.  “A 
python script uses this same key to decrypt the encrypted db file and presents the result in a well-
organized HTML page”. (Sahu, 2014) This decryption is completed on the WhatsApp 2.11.186, 
at the time, the most recent version.  An alternative to this method was to read the database files 
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entirely through the SQLite browser.  The location examined for an Android platform is 
/sdcard/WhatsApp/Databases/msgstore.db.crypt and for an iOS platform it is located at 
Application/net.whatsapp.WhatsApp/Documents/ChatStorage.sqlite.  Sahu included how to 
properly install and run the WhatsApp Xtract tool.  Listed below are the steps included: 
How to use: (Sahu, 2014) 
Step 1:Download WhatsApp Xtract package on 
your computer and extract it. 
Step 2: Download and install Python 
programming language environment on your 
computer. 
Step 3: Open the folder where you downloaded 
the WhatsApp Xtract archive. Find a file with 
name !install pyCrypto.bat, right click on it and 
click run as administrator. This bat file will 
execute the following Python command, pypm 
install pycrypto. This common automatically 
installs the pycrypto  library  on your computer, 
which will be used to decrypt the WhatsApp 
backup data. 




Depending upon the backup file you used. To run 
any of these files, simply right click on it and click 
run as administrator, just like above. 
You can also run whatsapp_xtract_console.bat to 
specify the WhatsApp backup file manually. 
/* For Android DB: */ 
python whatsapp_xtract.py -i msgstore.db -w wa.db 
/* If wa.db is unavailable */ 
python whatsapp_xtract.py -i msgstore.db 
 
/*For crypted DB*/ 
python whatsapp_xtract.py -i msgstore.db.crypt 
/*For iPhone DB*/ 
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python whatsapp_xtract.py -i ChatStorage.sqlite 
 
Reviewing the methods for the article by Aditya Mahajan, M.S. Dahiya, and H.P. Sanghvi 
(2013), the study was much more in depth than Sahu’s.   “Five Android phones were analyzed 
covering three different versions of Android OS: Froyo 2.2, GingerBread 2.3x, and Ice Cream 
Sandwich 4.0x” (Mahajan et., al).  The types of mobile devices included Sony Xperia STI5i 
mini, Sony Xperia Neo V (MT11i), LG P698, Samsung GSM GT-S5830, and HTC A8181 
Desire.  The acquisitions were done with both rooted and non-rooted Android devices. The 
purpose of this analysis was to determine what data and information could be located on the 
device’s internal memory.  The main focus was to explore the data within instant messenger, chat 
logs, images, or video.   
A File System extraction was conducted on each device using UFED (Universal Forensic 
Extraction Device), Classic Ultimate version 1.8.0.0.  Prior to the extractions being conducted, 
the USB Debugging option was enabled within the setting menu.  In this type of extraction, 
UFED extracts the various files such as database and configuration files.  It also extracts data of 
each application installed on the device and places it into separate folders.  In order to properly 
review this data once extracted, UFED Physical Analyzer, no version numbers were listed within 
this research, was used.  The examiner in these cases need to know where to look for the files 
and folders and what type of data they are examining because UFED Physical Analyzer can 
misinterpret the data or completely skip the data all together.  The following tables explain where 
each type of data can be found (Mahajan et., al).   
WhatsApp Msgstore.db Messages, chat_ list 
 Wa.db Wa.contacts, sqlite_sequence 
Viber Viber_call_log.db Viber_call_log 
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Viber data (database) Android_metadata 











 The file system of the devices examined contained these files on the internal memory of 
the phone, yet the images, video, and audio files of the WhatsApp are stored on the external 
memory card.  All of these images, videos, and audio files are stored within a folder called media 
on the memory card.  The methods used in this research were conducted with forensically sound 
equipment and followed the stringent rules of digital evidence collection and analysis.  Hash 
values were also generated for each device examined.  Users of the devices were asked to 
complete a set of pre-determined activities such as sending and receiving messages, video, audio, 
and images.  The users continuously used both applications for a period of three months. The 
study was conducted on both devices with the WhatsApp and Viber applications installed, and 
those devices that were manually installed just for this research.  The same tasks were completed 
on all devices.  The .ufd file was loaded into UFED Physical Analyzer, as well as, examined 
manually.  The following images are the devices used in this study.  




 Ultimately, Sahu was able to recover the data requested in its decrypted state.  The 
WhatsApp Xtract tool displays the information in the default browser on the user’s computer as 
shown in the figures 2-4 below. 
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 Overall, the data that was retrieved included contacts and messaging.  Although the 
article states that you can also retrieve video, images, GPS, and even audio, Sahu did not supply 
images to reveal those results.  These results were achieved on both iOS (ChatStorage.sqlite) and 
Android (msgstore.db & wa.db) databases.   
 The results for Mahajan were much more plentiful.  The amount of data retrieved showed 
that investigators can still gain drones of evidence from Android devices.  After conducting the 
file system extractions on all five devices, it was found that while most of the data was stored on 
the database file, some was also located on the memory card of the device.  There were chat logs 
that were stored in the internal memory of the phone and the external memory card, yet on the 
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external card, the logs were encrypted.  Within the Viber extraction, five database files were 
located, yet only three of the databases contained forensically useful information.    
 The extractions and completed with UFED, Classic Ultimate version 1.8.0.0 and UFED 
Physical Analyzer yielded an abundance of results for the WhatsApp, but not as in depth for the 
Viber application.  Table 1.1 shows the results for the analysis performed with UFED Physical 
Analyzer. 
Artifacts Found Artifacts Not Found 
Sent chat messages Contact list 
Received chat messages Profile pictures of users or contacts 
Time stamps of each chat session Locations of downloaded images or videos 
within WhatsApp 
Table 1.1 
Table 1.2 shows the information and data collected by doing a manual extraction. 
Activities Performed Similar Data Forensic 
Examinations 
Found/Not Found 
Artifact related to the 
WhatsApp account with 
which data was shared 
Found/Not Found 
Login phone number of user Not found N/A 
Received chat messages Found with timestamp Found with timestamp 
Outgoing messages Found with timestamp Found with timestamp 
Sent Images Found with timestamp. Sent 
image file name was found 
and the location of the image 
was on the memory card 
Found with timestamp 
Received Images Found with timestamp. 
Received image file name 
was found and the location of 
the image was on the memory 
card 
Found with timestamp 
Sent/received videos Found with timestamp. 
Sent/received video file name 
was found and the location of 
the image was on the memory 
card 
Found with timestamp 
Table 1.2 
 The results for the application Viber were less than useful when examining with UFED, 
Classic Ultimate version 1.8.0.0 and UFED Physical Analyzer.  During the examination, there 
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were no signs of anything pertaining to Viber until a manual extraction was completed.  On the 
manual extraction, phone numbers, text messages, dates, times, and duration of calls was located.  
The data also revealed all of the messaging information with dates, times, and who the phone 
number to the person on the other end of the communication.  Figures 5 and 6 reveal the results 
in UFED, Classic Ultimate version 1.8.0.0, without Viber being listed and the WhatsApp 
database examination with SQLite Database Browser.  
Figure 5             Figure 6 
 
While technology continuously advances, the ability for users to hide both criminal 
activity and obtain more anonymity increases the risk of investigators unable to locate 
information.  In the coming years, it may become more difficult to obtain pertinent information 
regarding criminal cases using mobile forensics.  With the articles that were reviewed, the 
information was found relatively easily in some cases.  Unfortunately, UFED, Classic Ultimate 
version 1.8.0.0 and UFED Physical Analyzer could not locate information on the application 
Viber.  This application is an older talk and texting application and the information within these 
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articles are also over three years old.  More research would need to be conducted to see if newer 
versions of UFED, Classic Ultimate version 1.8.0.0, would be able to locate this information.   
 The WhatsApp created a wealth of information with both commercial and open source 
tools.  It is unclear why the creator of this application would encrypt their databases, then allow 
the creation of a tool that could easily decrypt the same information it was protecting.  At the 
time of this article, the WhatsApp was using a version of the same encryption protocol as Signal.  
In 2016, the WhatsApp has completely integrated with the Signal protocol creating a secure end-
to-end encryption.  More research is needed to see if the same information could still be acquired 
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Chapter IV 
Discussion/Conclusion 
 The evolution of technology is upon us.  Every day, mobile device users are finding ways 
to cover their tracks, develop new applications, and ensure their own security instead of relying 
on companies.  These self-made companies such as Open Whisper Systems are popping up all 
over the globe.  These companies make the promise of safety, security, and anonymity when it 
comes to the users’ online presence and safeguarding all of their means of communication.  One 
of the concerns within the forensic community is that the software available can be helpful or 
hinder an investigation depending on the device.  With every advancement in technology, 
companies offer more commercial services to law enforcement so that they can extract data from 
a user’s device.  Often, there are limitations to these commercial products.  Even with product 
licensing, some features may still not be available.  For example, in this study, access to the 
iCloud was not available using Cellebrite’s Cloud Analyzer.   
 Another limitation to this study, every phone is different and especially with Android 
devices, the data is stored differently with different operating systems.  What you could discover 
on one device may not be located in the same location in the memory on another Android.  While 
storage of data is a limitation, the backup data is as well.  Androids can back up to Google Drive, 
while iPhone has the iCloud, both not accessible to law enforcement without additional warrants.  
While the UFED Cloud Analyzer support retrieved data from Google Play, WhatsApp, and other 
messaging applications, it does not support received data from the Signal Application.   
 Androids and iPhones also have device security that could limit what type and how much 
data is retrieved.  If any of the devices used would have had passwords, finger print, or even 
facial recognition to unlock the phone, then it could have hindered the data, if any, retrieved.  In 
MOBILE FORENSICS  52 
this study, there were no devices with security.  Cellebrite does offer tools that will unlock some 
types of passwords etc., but it was not required for this study. With any phone an examiner could 
run into the problem of having extraction options limited. This was the case in this study.  Three 
out of the four phones did not offer the physical extraction which limited the amount of data that 
was recovered.  On three of the devices, almost no data was retrieved.  Any examiner can run 
into this issue on a daily basis depending on the type of device.  The Cellebrite tools do not 
support every type of phone for a physical extraction.    
 The overall study was to discover which devices had more data uncovered, as well as, 
which products and open source tools were able to extract that data.  Based on the results, the 
data extracted was entirely dependent on which type of mobile device was used and which 
forensic tool or software was able to extract data from that type of device.  A physical extraction 
was only achieved on one of the devices. This device, the ZTE Z993, recovered more data than 
the other mobile devices in this study.  While the other Android device was not much newer than 
this one, it yielded less impressive extraction results.  Unfortunately, there were not nearly the 
same amount of results from the extractions on the iPhone 4S or the iPhone 7.  These two 
devices did not get physical extractions, only logical and the filesystem extractions.  Since the 
physical extraction always extracts the most data, if the physical extractions were supported for 
the Android LG, iPhone 4S or the iPhone 7, there could have potentially been more data 
recovered.  
 Research previously conducted on a similar topic was with the WhatsApp. While this 
application uses a similar version of the signal encryption, the results just with a tool called the 
WhatsApp extractor was able to pull viable results from user mobile devices.  This research was 
dated, circa 2012-2013, which created even more reason to give this topic updated results with 
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the Signal Application that started it all. As previously stated, the results here, while not in 
abundance, shows the limitations of the software, and the differences in devices.  
 The future potential for studies such as this are exponential.  There are updates to mobile 
devices, software, and the development of applications on a daily basis.  One of the markets on 
the rise is the development of not only messaging applications, but those with security features 
that are necessary for the user to maintain anonymity.   Users sometimes forget that even if they 
don’t want to, their lives are stored in some way on their phones.  As stated, the government 
were even taking advantage of the newer applications such as Signal to maintain privacy and 
security of communications.  The type of research that can be further explored can include 
different types of software, paid options of open source tools, and analyzing data from the cloud 
or back up storage with both Android and Apple devices.  It could have uncovered different 
results using different deleted recovery methods or different types of mobile devices.  Since this 
study was only meant to be completed using the basic forensic commercial and open source 
tools, another examiner could potentially use this data and expand on software and hardware 
capabilities.  
 In conclusion, the forensic community will continue to evolve as long as there is a need 
for the services.  In this case, mobile devices are just becoming more and more prominent in 
criminal, civil, and private litigations. These results are only based on the devices that were used 
in this study, but with different devices, operating systems, and future forensic tools, the results 
could be completely different.  The results that may or may not be retrieved can create many 
more questions or uncover more or less data.  These devices store the user’s whole life on them, 
and no matter how many security measures taken, there will always pieces left behind.   
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